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Abstract
Criticism is mounting on business schools for their excessive focus on research and for neglecting teaching.
We show that if students have imperfect information about a school’s overall capabilities and if business
schools diﬀer in their research productivity, the least productive schools may do as much research as the
top-tier ones only to manipulate students’ expectations. In turn, the most productive schools might resort
to excess research in order to signal their type in the eyes of future students. This signaling equilibrium is
characterized by a relative neglect of teaching by the top-tier schools. Such a situation is socially ineﬃcient
as compared to the perfect information case.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing development of the service sector in the Western economies and the increased com-
petition between firms in a globalized world brought about a substantial demand for high quality
managerial skills. This transformation helped Business Schools [B-Schools, thereafter] to become
important players in the education sector. While in the 1950s their main purpose was to pro-
vide basic, professionally oriented education, these days scholarship and research become essential
dimensions of their mission such as understood by society and by themselves. Since a school’s
reputation is connected to its research performance (Armstrong, 1995; Becker et al., 2003), in
an ever more globalized environment B-Schools have no other choice than to compete on this
dimension too (Kwok and Arpan, 2002).
Yet the growing enthusiasm of B-Schools for theoretical advances has been subject to criticism
in the last few years. A recent report of the AACSB summarizes well the widespread popular grief:
"business schools have recently been criticized for placing too much emphasis on research relative
to teaching, and for producing research that is too narrow, irrelevant and impractical" (AACSB,
2007, p.6).1 The criticism sounds louder with respect to the top institutions. For instance,
Bennis and O’Toole (2005, p.98) claim that: "many leading B-Schools have quietly adopted an
inappropriate - and ultimately self defeating - model of academic excellence. Instead of measuring
themselves in terms of the competence of their graduates, or by how well their faculty understand
important drivers of business performance, they measure themselves almost solely by the rigor of
their scientific research".
Why schools would engage in a race for publications that brings only a limited direct value
to students and managers? Some authors have indicated that excess research can be a Nash
equilibrium strategy in a game where each Dean pushes his faculty to target the top-tier journals,
although such a generalized strategy harms the quality of the top-tier journals and the returns
from publishing (Besancenot and Vranceanu, 2007; Besancenot et al., 2008). Other explanations
put forward some form of Deans’ irrationality, who, being fascinated by rankings, would become
1 The report, which in general supports the business schools concern for developing new managerial theories,
makes a strong case for enhancing their impact of research and education on various constituencies.
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unable to perceive what firms and students really need (e.g., Pfeﬀer and Fong, 2002; Bennis and
O’Toole, 2005).
A simple signaling model2 may provide an alternative explanation for the abnormal investment
in research by B-Schools. "Normality" will be defined in a very specific way, as the amount of
research that would prevail in a perfect information set-up. If future students cannot assess the
overall quality of a business school, some schools may implement excess research strategies only
to signal their type. The model features two types of schools, which diﬀer in their eﬃciency in the
production of research. We refer to the highly eﬃcient ones as H−schools, and to the less eﬃcient
ones as L−schools. A key assumption is that information is imperfect. More precisely, future
students, who value both teaching quality and research, can observe only the latter. Indeed, in
the Internet Era, the research performance of a given school is easy to grasp. Many bibliometric
measures are available and media, researchers and administrations use them to provide yearly
rankings and evaluations of various schools and departments. Schools themselves advertise loudly
about their research credentials and achievements.3 To the contrary, the quality of an education
programme is much more diﬃcult to measure. True, the formal aspect (textbooks, cases, teaching
material) can be observed, but less so the quality of the curriculum, i.e., whether it is really
adapted to the new challenges for tomorrow managers, whether it takes into account the most
relevant theories, whether it uses the most eﬃcient teaching methods. As mentioned by Demski
and Zymmerman (2000, p. 343), "faculties often have better information about what students
will find useful than the students themselves, or even recruiters". Paul and Rubin (1984, p. 143)
state that "in most disciplines, students are, by definition, incapable of judging the ‘state of the
art’ or of determining the ‘usefulness’ of the material presented in class."
In this context, an equilibrium is defined as a situation where schools implement their optimal
research strategies and students’ beliefs are correct. We show that in a static framework, which
takes as given the distribution of schools, the game presents several equilibria, most of them
characterized by an excessive amount of research as compared to the perfect information case.
2 See for the basic framework Spence (1973, 2002) and Vickers (1986).
3 Becker et al. (2003) found empirical evidence that students are attracted to schools by faculty research.
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Yet in a long run perspective, schools can modify their faculty profile. It seems reasonable
to assume that the more productive scholars can get a better wage, given that they are more
productive and that they probably have better outside opportunities (Faria, 2001; Coupé, 2004;
Besancenot and Vranceanu, 2007). We will show that in this model, L-schools have little incentive
to spend more in order to become H-schools, while the research oriented schools can have an
incentive to become L-schools. Hence, in the long run the frequency of H-schools may well decline
and the range of feasible equilibria gets narrower. If there is a large productivity gap between
the two types of schools, in the long run all H-schools produce an excessive amount research and
neglect teaching quality. If the productivity gap is narrow, in the long run H-schools will all
choose to become L-schools, probably a much worse situation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the basic assumptions and
presents the benchmark perfect information case. The equilibria of the game are analyzed in
section 3, first in the large productivity gap and then in the small productivity gap case. The last
section presents the conclusion.
2 Main assumptions
We assume that, in the short run, there are barriers to entry into the education business. Thus,
the number of B-Schools is predetermined and will be normalized to one. The number of students
that a school can recruit is given, and is equal across schools. All schools deliver an MBA; the
curricula contains a fixed number of hours. Schools dispose of a fixed endowment in faculty work
hours, l. Faculty members can used their working time either to do research lR or to improve
the teaching quality lT . The teaching quality depends on the hours spent by the faculty on
pedagogical innovation and program development, lT . The measure of quality in teaching is a
continuous variable T . In the simplest framework, getting one teaching quality unit requires aT
hours of work, i.e. aTT = lT .
When it comes to research, let R be the amount of research produced by a school.4 The
4 There is no need to be very specific about how this measure is obtained; in general research is assessed by
the contribution of the school to the intellectual debate, which may take the form of papers, books and other
publications, interviews, etc.
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production of research is also assumed to be a linear function of the time devoted to this activity:
aRR = lR, with aR a fixed production coeﬃcient representing the number of hours needed to
produce one research unit. We assume that scholars diﬀer in their research productivity. Lety aτR
denote the number of hours needed to produce one research unit by a type τ scholar. There are
two types of scholars, H and L, with aHR < a
L
R, the H-scholar is more productive (i.e., needs less
time to produce one research unit). To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that some
schools have recruited only H-type scholars and the other have recruited only L-type scholars.
Hence, we have two types of schools either, the H-school, with a high research potential and the
L-school, with a low research potential. The type τ is thus representative of both the school and
its faculty. We denote by q the frequency of H-schools.
Remark that in this paper schools diﬀer only in the faculty research productivity, if all their
writing hours were used for improving teaching quality, all schools would perform identically. To
the contrary, if all their working time l is used for research, the total volume of research is bigger
for H-schools than for L-schools: l/aHR > l/a
L
R.
Under these assumptions, for a type τ school, the hour constraint (with equality, deans do
their job) is:
aτRR+ aTT = l, with τ ∈ {L,H}. (1)
To this constraint corresponds a "production frontier" made up of possible bundles (T,R) to be
obtained with the amount of hours l. To further simplify notation, we set aT = 1 and l = 1.
We represent in Figure 1 two production frontiers (one for each type of school τ) in the plane
{OT,OR} as straight lines of slope −(1/aτR). When all resources are used to improve education
quality, the latter is l/aT = 1; when all resources are used for research, H-schools produce 1/aHR
research units and L schools produce 1/aLR research units.
Notice that along the production frontier of a school τ , a given level of research R implies a
level of education T τ (R), with τ = H or L.
Students value both the quality of education and research (Armstrong, 1995; Becker et al.,
2003; Demski and Zymmerman, 2000; AACSB, 2007). In a general form, we can represent their
utility by a function U(R, T ), with ∂U(,)∂T > 0,
∂U(,)
∂R > 0 and entailing convex indiﬀerence curves.
5
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Schools can charge tuition fees such that the expected surplus of the students is zero. So
tuition fees are Φ(R) = E[U(R, T τ (R))] with τ = H or L. Under these assumptions, in a perfect
information set up, schools would simply choose the bundle (Rτ , T τ ) that maximizes tuition fees
given their hour constraint, such as indicated in Figure 1:
R
T
RL
RH
ΦpHΦpL
0
RHH
TH(RH)TL(RL) 1
Figure 1: The Perfect Information Case
More precisely, the optimal amount of research under perfect information are RL (for the L-
school) and RH (for the H-school). The connected teaching qualities are TL(RL) and respectively
TH(RH). Tuition fees are equal to student’s willingness-to-pay for the observed service levels,
ΦLp = U(R
L, TL(RL)) for the L-school and ΦHp = U(R
H , TH(RH)) for the H-school, where the
p subscript indicates the perfect information case. In Figure 1, we represented a situation where
TL(RL) < TH(RH). This is not a necessary condition and our analysis also holds in the opposite
case, TL(RL) > TH(RH). However, this case, where teaching is a "normal" good and the income
eﬀect oﬀsets the substitution eﬀect seems to be the most realistic.
5 A specific utility function featuring these more general properties can be worked out if students care about
their discounted flow of income. School’s reputation or research should have a strong impact on the first period wage
(with decreasing weights on next periods) and education, by enhancing student’s productivity, has a substantial
impact on lifetime wages.
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However, the assumption of perfect information — useful for introducing the basic notation — is
not very realistic given that an education programme can be seen as a very complex commodity.
So, in order to build our model on a logic of imperfect information, we need several additional
assumptions. We will assume that research is an observable variable, that can be measured by
standard indicators (quality adjusted number of publication, number of citations, etc.). Students
can also assess the formal aspect of education (classes’ sizes, teaching material, library facilities,
etc.) however they have no means to assess whether the content is relevant, up-to-date, original,
innovative, etc. In other words, the quality of teaching is private information to the school.
Furthermore, students know the distribution of types of schools.
In an imperfect information set-up, the set of strategies is more sophisticated. A L-school
may deliver its perfect information research level RL; it can also play RH , the perfect information
research level of the H-school. A H-school can produce its perfect information research level RH ;
if they want to make sure that L-schools do not imitate them, they should produce a so high
amount of research that a L-school cannot deliver it (recall that L-schools have a lower research
productivity). Let us denote by RHH this lowest level of research unattainable by a L-school (see
Figure 1), RHH is the second research strategy available for a H-school. Notice that a H-school
would never play RL, because it has no interest to go for a L-school.6
For a research level j ∈ {L,H,HH}, a school’s payoﬀ is Φ(Rj) = E[U(Rj , T τ (Rj))].Notice that
research levels RHH and RL reveal perfectly a school’s type. Thus Φ(RHH) = U(RHH , TH(RHH))
and Φ(RL) = U(RL, TL(RL)). Students’ expected payoﬀ given the school’s research strategy Rj
are E[U(Rj , T τ (Rj)]− Φ(Rj) = 0.
The typical sequence of decisions goes like this (Figure 2 presents the decision tree):
• Step 0, Nature picks the type of school, either L or H.
• Step 1, depending on their type, schools chose their research strategy.
• Step 2, students make their opinion about the type of school given the observed level of
research and pay a tuition fee equal to their expected utility.
6 It could be shown that all other strategies are dominated.
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Nature
H-school
L-school
q
1-q
RHH
RH
RH
RL
Φ(RHH)= U(RΗΗ,TH(RHH))
Φ(RL)= U(RL,TL(RL))
Φ(RH)=E[U(RH,Tτ(RH))]
Payoff of the school
Figure 2: The Decision Tree
3 Equilibria
3.1 Definition and types
An equilibrium of this game is defined as a situation where schools research strategies are optimal
(allow them to charge the largest fees) given students’s beliefs about the type of school, and
students’ beliefs are correct given schools’ optimal strategies. As is often the case with these
games, we may distinguish between a separating equilibrium, where the strategy of the schools
perfectly reveals their type, a pooling equilibrium where all schools implement the same strategy
and thus no information about the type of school can be inferred from the observed research
strategy, and hybrid equilibria wherein schools play Nash mixed strategies and their strategy
carry some information about their type.
Before turning to analyzing the various equilibria, we would first notice that if the L-school
cannot implement the perfect information optimal research level of the H−school, the prevailing
equilibrium is of the separating type: each school is delivering its perfect information optimal
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amounts of research and education quality. In order to rule out this trivial case, in the following
we assume that L−schools have the resources to deliver the amount of research RH , or, in an
equivalent way, that that RHH > RH (see Appendix 1 - case 1 for the formal proof).
We also must call attention on a critical value of aLR, denoted by a˜
L
R and implicitly defined by
the equation U(RHH , TH(RHH)) = U(RL, TL(RL)). In other words, there is a value of aLR such
that H-schools that implement the signaling strategy get the same payoﬀ as L-schools that signals
themselves by implementing the perfect information optimum of research (see Appendix 2 for the
formal proof).
R
T
RL
RH
ΦpL
0
RHH
slope
L
Ra~
1−
ΦpH
TH(RH)TL(RL) 1
Figure 3: The Critical Threshold
Furthermore, for aLR > a˜
L
R, what we refer to as the "strong productivity gap" case, we have
U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)), or:
U(RH , TL(RH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RH , TH(RH)) (2)
In the opposite case, if the two type of scholars do not diﬀer too much in their research productivity,
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that is if a˜LR > a
L
R > a
H
R , we check that U(R
L, TL(RL)) > U(RHH , TH(RHH)), or:
U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RH , TH(RH)) (3)
We recall that U(RH , TL(RH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)).
We will show that depending on aLR and q, the following equilibria can occur (Table 1):
EQUILIBRIA
Strong gap
aLR> a˜
L
R
Moderate gap
a˜LR> a
L
R> a
H
R
Pooling: All schools play RH , ∀τ q ≥ q1∈ [0, 1] q ≥ q2∈ [0, 1]
Signalling: All H schools play RHHand all L schools play RL Always possible Impossible
Hybrid 1: All L and some H play RH , the other H play RHH q > q1∈ [0, 1] Impossible
Hybrid 2: All H and some L play RH , the other L play RL Impossible q < q2∈ [0, 1]
Table 1: Types of equilibria
We study first the strong productivity gap case, then turn to the moderate productivity gap
case.
3.2 The strong productivity gap case: a˜LR < a
L
R
The strong productivity case corresponds to a situation where faculty research productivity in the
L-schools is low enough, that is the time to produce one paper is larger than the critical value:
aLR > a˜
L
R. We have shown that in this case the critical utilities can be ranked: U(R
H , TL(RH)) <
U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RH , TH(RH)).
3.2.1 Pooling equilibrium: all schools do RH
We first can put forward the existence of a pooling equilibrium where all schools play RH . The
L-school does RH (it imitates the eﬃcient production of research of a H−school) and the H-school
decides not to signal itself by doing RHH (it chooses the amount RH). Denoting a school’s strategy
as a function of its type by s(τ), in this equilibrium schools’ optimal strategies are s(τ) = RH
∀τ ∈ {H,L}.
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Let us denote by Pr[τ |Rj ] the probability students assign to the event that a school is of type
τ (with τ ∈ {H,L}) if the research strategy is Rj , with j ∈ {HH,H,L}. Students’ equilibrium
beliefs can be written: ⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pr[H|RHH ] = 1
Pr[H|RH ] = q
Pr[H|RL] = 0
, (4)
with probabilities Pr[L|Rj] being complements to Pr[H|Rj ].
Necessary conditions for this equilibrium are:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Φ(RHH) < Φ(RH) for the H-school
Φ(RL) < Φ(RH) for the L-school
. (5)
Since Φ(RL) < Φ(RHH) because U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)), the equilibrium exists
under the single condition Φ(RHH) < Φ(RH). In turn, this implies that the frequency of H-schools
is high enough:
Φ(RHH) < Φ(RH)
⇔ U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < E[U(RH , T τ (RH))]
⇔ U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < qU(RH , TH(RH)) + (1− q)U(RH , TL(RH))
⇔ q > q1 ≡
U(RHH , TH(RHH))− U(RH , TL(RH))
U(RH , TH(RH))− U(RH , TL(RH)) . (6)
Given that U(RH , TL(RH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RH , TH(RH)), we
know that q1 ∈ [0.1]. So this equilibrium exists if the frequency of H-schools is large enough. If
there are not too many L-schools, they can fond into the mass of H-schools by implementing
the same research strategy, to the expense of their teaching performance; furthermore H-schools
have no incentive to signal themselves by increasing the amount of research, this strategy is too
expensive.
This situation, which can hold in the short run, might not be stable in the long run. Since H-
schools get the same tuition fees as L-schools, some of them may choose to become L-schools (they
fire their productive researchers and hire less productive and probably less expensive ones). But
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in this case, the frequency of H-schools would fall below q1, and this equilibrium would vanish.7
3.2.2 Signalling equilibrium: L-schools do RL and H-schools do RHH
We can show that a separating equilibrium with signalling, where H−schools deliver the "sig-
nalling" level of research RHH and L−schools produce their eﬃcient level, is always possible. In
this equilibrium, schools’ strategies are:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
s(H) = RHH
s(L) = RL
. (7)
Equilibrium beliefs: ⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pr[H|RHH ] = 1
Pr[H|RH ] = 0
Pr[H|RL] = 0
. (8)
This equilibrium is feasible under the necessary conditions:
a) For the L-school, the condition Φ
¡
RL
¢
> Φ
¡
RH
¢
is always true, given that Φ
¡
RH
¢
=
Pr[H|RH ]U(RH , TH(RH)) + Pr[L|RH ]U(RH , TL(RH)) and U ¡RL, TL(RL)¢ > U(RH , TL(RH)).
b) For the H-school, the condition Φ
¡
RHH
¢
> Φ
¡
RH
¢
is equivalent to U(RHH , TH(RHH)) >
U(RH , TL(RH)). Because in the case under scrutiny U(RH , TL(RH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)) <
U(RH , TH(RH)), this last condition is true.
In this case, the excessive research strategy implemented by the H-school implies that their
education falls below their eﬃcient education level, TH(RHH) < TH(RH). Their education quality
level may even be lower than the education level of L-schools.
This equilibrium, which holds in the short run, can be stable in the long run given that H-
schools get larger tuition fees than L-schools.8
3.2.3 Hybrid equilibrium 1: high excess research
In this equilibrium, some H-schools decide to signal themselves by playing RHH , and the other
H-schools don’t (they play RH). In this case, L-schools may want to copy them and play RH .
7 The prevailing equilibrium is analyzed in the next subsection.
8 To be more specific, if the cost of employing the highly productive researchers is CH and the cost of employing
the less productive researchers is CL, a H-school has no incentive to transform into a L-school if Φ
?
RHH
?
−
Φ
?
RL
?
> (CH −CL).
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Denoting by σ() a mixed strategy, schools’ equilibrium strategies can be written as:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
σ(H) = {αRHH + (1− α)RH |α ∈ [0, 1]}
s(L) = RH
. (9)
where α is the fraction of H-schools playing RHH .
Using Bayes rule, and denoting by Pr[Rj |τ ] the probability that a school of type τ plays
strategy Rj , equilibrium beliefs can be written:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pr[H|RHH ] = 1
Pr[H|RH ] = Pr[R
H |H] Pr[H]
Pr[RH ]
=
(1− α)q
(1− α)q + (1− q)
Pr[L|RL] = 1
. (10)
In equilibrium, a H-school must be indiﬀerent between strategy RH and RHH :
Φ(RHH) = Φ(RH)
⇔ U(RHH , TH(RHH)) = Pr[H|RH ]U ¡RH , TH(RH)¢+ Pr[L|RH ]U ¡RH , TL(RH)¢
⇔ U(RHH , TH(RHH)) = (1− α)q
(1− α)q + (1− q)U
¡
RH , TH(RH)
¢
+
(1− q)
(1− α)q + (1− q)U
¡
RH , TL(RH)
¢
.
(11)
The later equation allow us to determine α with respect to the predetermined variables:
α =
q
£
U
¡
RH , TH(RH)
¢
− U(RHH , TH(RHH))
¤
− (1− q)
£
U(RHH , TH(RHH))− U
¡
RH , TL(RH)
¢¤
q(U (RH , TH(RH))− U(RHH , TH(RHH)) .
(12)
Obviously, α < 1. On the other hand, α > 0 if:
q > q1 ≡
U(RHH , TH(RHH))− U(RH , TL(RH))
U (RH , TH(RH))− U (RH , TL(RH)) . (13)
Recall that q1 was previously defined as the threshold for which the pooling equilibrium can occur
(Eq.6). Here α can be seen as a monotonously increasing function in q, with α = 0 for q = q1 < 1
and α = 1 for q = 1.
We can also check that the condition for a L-school always holds; indeed, Φ(RL) < Φ(RH) =
Φ(RHH) given that U
¡
RL, TL(RL)
¢
< U
¡
RHH , TH(RHH)
¢
.
The frequency of H-schools who decide to signal by implementing the RHH strategy depends
on the proportion q of H-schools in total population of schools. The larger this proportion, less H-
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schools would implement the oversignaling strategy. Clearly this equilibrium comes with some form
of abnormal proliferation of research as compared to the perfect information case. All L-schools
imitate the H ones and adopt the research level RH ; as a reaction to this imitation strategy, some
H-schools decide to signal their type by providing excessive research. In particular, for q = q1,
all H-schools do RHH , and all L-schools do RH , the overall volume of abnormal research is at its
highest level.
In a long run setup, H-schools may want to become L-schools, since they could get the same
fees at at lower cost. In this case, the frequency q would decline over time; yet below q1 this
equilibrium vanishes too (as does the pooling one).
In the large productivity gap case, if q < q1, only the signaling equilibrium exists. For q > q1
the game presents multiple equilibria: the signaling, pooling and hybrid equilibrium here above
are all feasible. Whatever the prevailing equilibrium, an abnormal level of research is delivered
(as compared to the perfect information case), at the expense of quality in education. Yet, in a
long run perspective, the frequency of H-schools would decline in both the pooling and the hybrid
cases; when q = q1 both these equilibria vanish to the benefit of the signaling equilibrium.9
We turn now to the analysis of the moderate productivity gap case.
3.3 Moderate productivity gap: a˜LR > a
L
R > a
H
R
When a˜LR > a
L
R > a
H
R , we have shown that U(R
HH , TH(RHH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RH , TH(RH)).
3.3.1 Pooling equilibrium: all schools do RH
In this case too, an equilibrium where all schools play RH is feasible. H-schools does not signal
themselves by doing RHH , and the L-schools mimic the H-schools. Schools’ strategies are s(τ) =
RH ,∀τ .
We write the equilibrium beliefs:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Pr[H|RHH ] = 1
Pr[H|RH ] = q
Pr[H|RL] = 0
. (14)
9 The Appendix 1 shows that the Hybrid Equilibrium 2 is impossible in the strong productivity gap case.
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Necessary existence conditions are:
a) For the H-school:
Φ(RHH) = U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < Pr[H|RH ]U(RH , TH(RH))+Pr[L|RH ]U(RH , TL(RH)) = Φ(RH).
(15)
b) For the L-school:
Φ(RL) = U(RL, TL(RL)) < Pr[H|RH ]U(RH , TH(RH)) + Pr[L|RH ]U(RH , TL(RH)) = Φ(RH).
(16)
Given that U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)), a suﬃcient condition is:
U(RL, TL(RL)) < qU(RH , TH(RH)) + (1− q)U(RH , TL(RH)), (17)
equivalent to:
q > q2 ≡
U(RL, TL(RL))− U(RH , TL(RH))
U(RH , TH(RH))− U(RH , TL(RH)) . (18)
Because U(RH , TL(RH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RH , TH(RH)), we have q2 ∈ [0, 1].
So this equilibrium where the research level is substantial, given that L-schools do as much
research as H-schools in perfect information, can occur for q > q2. Because all L-schools do more
research than their eﬃcient level, the quality of their teaching is hampered.
In this case too, if schools can change their faculty profile in the long run, some H-schools may
want to turn into L-schools. But in this case, the proportion of H-schools will decline. We study
in the next section what can happen if this proportion falls below q2.
3.3.2 Hybrid equilibrium 2: Low excess research
In this equilibrium, H-schools play RH and a only a fraction β of the L-schools do the same.
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
s(H) = RH
σ(L) = {βRH + (1− β)RL |β ∈ [0, 1]}
(19)
Equilibrium beliefs are:
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Pr[H|RH ] = Pr[R
H |H] Pr[H]
Pr[RH ]
=
q
q + (1− q)β
Pr[L|RL] = 1
. (20)
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In equilibrium an L-school must be indiﬀerent between playing RL or RH , that is Φ(RL) = Φ(RH).
This condition leads to the equilibrium frequency of L-schools doing RH .
U
¡
RL, TL(RL)
¢
= Pr[H|RH ]U ¡RH , TH(RH)¢+Pr[L|RH ]U ¡RH , TL(RH)¢
=
qU
¡
RH , TH(RH)
¢
+ β(1− q)U
¡
RH , TL(RH)
¢
q + (1− q)β
⇔ β = q
(1− q)
£
U
¡
RH , TH(RH)
¢
− U
¡
RL, TL(RL)
¢¤
[U (RL, TL(RL))− U (RH , TL(RH))] . (21)
We remark that β is an increasing function in q. For q = 0 we have β = 0 and for q = q2, such
as defined in Equation (18), we get β = 1. So this equilibrium prevails whenever q < q2. Some
L-schools do too much research; their frequency increases if the proportion of H-schools goes up.
We can also check that for a H-school, the condition Φ(RHH) < Φ(RH) = Φ(RL) always holds
given that U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U
¡
RL, TL(RL)
¢
.
Since L-schools that get the same fees as H-schools but have lower costs, in the long run
the H-schools might want to transform themselves into L-schools: q would decline, and so will
do β. At the end of the day all schools would become of the L-type along a standard adverse
selection process.10 Although losses connected to imperfect information would disappear, the
overall production of research is the lowest that such an economy can deliver.
4 Conclusion
There is a lot of criticism these days about B-Schools doing too much and not always relevant
research. Furthermore, critics point out that the excessive emphasis on research comes at the
expense of teaching quality. This paper shows in a simple signaling framework the conditions
in which such scenarios are possible. In particular, we argue that if there is a large research
productivity gap between top and normal schools, the latter would implement the same level of
research as the top-tier schools only in order to manipulate student’s expectations. The rational
response of leading schools is to implement excessive research strategies only to signal themselves
to future students. As an upshot of these, as long as information is imperfect, there is little chance
to obtain an eﬃcient separation between the two types of schools. Policies might consider make
10 The Appendix1 shows that the two other equilibria put forward in the large productivity gap case are impossible
in the moderate research gap case.
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it hard for L-schools to implement the level of research of the H-schools. Yet such measure might
not benefit of political support since it conflicts with the principle of managerial autonomy of
these institutions.
Even if the signaling equilibrium is socially ineﬃcient, it is probably less detrimental than a
situation where all top schools choose to become normal schools by giving up the research oriented
recruitment of faculty, what can be expected in low productivity gap case. To avoid this poor
outcome, public policy should make sure that the productivity gap between a small group of
top tier schools and the rest of them is large enough. In this case the signaling equilibrium will
prevail. If the frequency of leading schools is too big, the analysis has shown that other equilibria
can occur, wherein leading schools have no incentive to invest in research. These recommendations
are consistent with the EU research and superior education policy of supporting the creation of
pan-European centres of excellence "competitive at a global scale" (EU, 2007).
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5 Appendix 1. Trivial and impossible equilibria
Case 1 Trivial separating equilibrium: each school delivers the perfect information (or eﬃcient)
amount of research.
In a separating equilibrium, schools’ strategies are s(τ) = Rτ with τ ∈ {H,L}. The probability
that the school is of type τ if the research strategy is Rj was denoted by Pr[τ |Rj ]. The equilibrium
beliefs are: Pr[H|RH ] = 1 and Pr[L|RL] = 1. In this equilibrium, research strategies reveal the
type of the school. Students make no assessment error, tuition fees are Φ(RH) = U(RH , TH(RH))
and Φ(RL) = U(RL, TL(RL)). A necessary condition of existence for this equilibrium is that a
type L-school prefers Φ(RL) to Φ(RH). Given that U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RH , TH(RH)), a L-school
always find more profitable to play RH than RL,i.e. Φ(RL) < Φ(RH). Hence this equilibrium can
appear only if the strategy RH is not possible for the L-school, because its resources are too small,
i.e. if RHH ≤ RH .
Case 2 In the "high research gap" case, the Hybrid equilibrium 2 is impossible.
We recall that U(RH , TL(RH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RH , TH(RH)).
Schools’ strategies can be written s(H) = RH and σ(L) = {βRH + (1 − β)RL |β ∈ [0, 1]}. The
equilibrium beliefs are Pr[H|RH ] = Pr[RH |H] Pr[H]Pr[RH ] = qq+(1−q)β and Pr[L|RL] = 1. Necessary and
suﬃcient conditions are Φ(RL) = Φ(RH). For a L-school and Φ(RHH) < Φ(RH) for a H-school.
But Φ(RHH) < Φ(RH) = Φ(RL) is tantamount to U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U
¡
RL, TL(RL)
¢
which
is false in our case.
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Case 3 In the "moderate research gap" case, the signalling equilibrium where the L-school does
RL and the H-school does RHH is impossible.
Recall that in this case U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RH , TH(RH)).
Schools’ strategies are: s(H) = RHH and s(L) = RL. Equilibrium beliefs Pr[H|RHH ] = 1 and
Pr[H|RH ] = Pr[H|RL] = 0. This equilibrium is feasible if Φ ¡RHH¢ > Φ ¡RH¢ . But this condition
implies U(RHH , TH(RHH)) > U(RH , TL(RH)). In the case of a moderate gap this inequality is
false.
Case 4 In the "moderate research gap" case, the Hybrid equilibrium 1 (partial over signaling by
H-schools; high excess research equilibrium) is impossible
This case implies U(RHH , TH(RHH)) < U(RL, TL(RL)) < U(RH , TH(RH)).
Strategies are σ(H) = {αRHH+(1−α)RH |α ∈ [0, 1]} and s(L) = RH . Beliefs can be written:
Pr[H|RHH ] = 1, Pr[H|RH ] = Pr[RH |H] Pr[H]
Pr[RH ] =
(1−α)q
(1−α)q+(1−q) and Pr[H|RL] = 0. The necessary
and suﬃcient condition for a L-school : Φ(RL) < Φ(RH) = Φ(RHH) or U
¡
RL, TL(RL)
¢
<
U
¡
RHH , TH(RHH)
¢
, which is false.
6 Appendix 2. Existence of a˜LR
In order to verify that a value such as a˜LR does exist, we must study how U(R
HH , TH(RHH))
and U(RL, TL(RL)) vary with respect to aLR. On the one hand, it can be shown that the eﬃcient
utility level Φ(RHH) = U(RHH , TH(RHH)) is an increasing function in aLR : dΦ(R
HH)/daLR > 0.
The proof begins with the remark that Φ(RHH) is a decreasing function of RHH for any RHH
in the interval [RH , 1/aHR ]. Indeed, dΦ(R
HH) = U 0RdR
HH + U 0T
µ
dTH(RHH)
dRHH
¶
dRHH where
TH(RHH) = 1 − aHRRHH . It turns out that dΦ(RHH) =
¡
U 0R − aHRU 0T
¢
dRHH . But RHH = 1aLR
so dRHH = − 1
(aLR)
2 daLR. Thus: dΦ(R
HH) = − 1
(aLR)
2
¡
U 0R − aHRU 0T
¢
daLR or, in an equivalent way,
dΦ(RHH)
daLR
= −a
H
RU
0
R
(aLR)
2
µ
1
aHR
− U
0
T
U 0R
¶
. Given that −U
0
T
U 0R
=
µ
dR
dT
¶
U=Ct
and because
1
aHR
− U
0
T
U 0R
< 0 for
RHH > RH , we get
dΦ(RHH)
daLR
> 0.
On the other hand, the eﬃcient utility level Φ(RL) = U(RL, TL(RL)) is a decreasing function
of aLR : dΦ(R
L)/daLR < 0.
In the limit case aLR = a
H
R , we check Φ(R
L) = U(RH , TH(RH)) > U(RHH , TH(RHH)) =
18
Φ(RHH) and, in the opposite case, aLR = 1/R
H (i.e.: RH = RHH ) we verify Φ(RL) < Φ(RHH) =
U(RH , TH(RH)). So there is a a˜LR in the interval
£
aHR , 1/R
H
¤
for which Φ(RL) = Φ(RHH).
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